Abstract How does the development of one transport mode influence the development of another? This paper uses time-series data to test whether inter-model network externalities influenced the development of road, canal, and port infrastructure in England from 1760 to 1830. The main finding is that road development had a positive effect on canal development. The results suggest that the option value of waiting to invest in a canal diminished when nearby road improvements were initiated because there was less uncertainty about future profits from canal tolls. They also suggest a reinterpretation of road transport in the Industrial Revolution and point to the general importance of inter-modal network externalities.
Background on roads, ports, and canals in England
The pre-railway transport network in England underwent a substantial transformation between 1760 and 1830. This section briefly reviews the trends in road, port, and canal improvements, their legal and organization aspects, and reviews the existing hypotheses about which factors influenced transport development.
England had an extensive road network in 1760, but it became larger and better maintained by 1830.
2 Since the middle ages there was a network of roads connecting London with all major provincial centers, like Bristol, Shrewsbury, York, and Norwich. There were also 'cross-roads' connecting provincial centers. After 1760 many primary and secondary roads were resurfaced with gravel and were widened to allow for greater traffic. There was also greater construction of new roads, especially near industrial areas and large cities. New road construction accelerated in the 1790s and early 1800s and continued up to 1830.
As an island nation, Britain had ports since time immemorial. 3 Over time ports were restricted to a set of locations where customs taxes were collected. In 1760, there were 74 ports in England or Wales and most were located in the southeast near London. The expansion of foreign trade during the mid-18th century placed greater demands on existing port facilities. New docks and harbors were needed to handle larger ships and the increased volume. Wet docks were constructed in the major ports of Liverpool, Bristol, London, and Hull as well as in emerging ports like Lancaster, Goole, and Grimsby. There were also improvements to harbors in smaller ports throughout the country, many of which served specific types of trade. All of these improvements contributed to a substantial increase in port capacity and efficiency by 1830.
The canal era began in earnest with the opening of the Duke of Bridgewater's canal in 1761. 4 It linked the town of Worsley with Manchester. It was enormously successful because it allowed the Duke to sell coal from his estates to a large number of urban consumers and factories. Bridgewater's canal was quickly emulated. Birmingham had its first canal in 1772 and several river systems, like the Trent, Mersey, Severn, and Humber, were linked by canals in 1777. The initial burst of investment slowed between 1775 and 1789, but was later reignited in the 1790s. The years 1793 and 1794 are famously known as the 'canal mania,' in which 28 canals were initiated, mostly in the midlands and the north. The most famous was the 60-mile Grand Junction canal connecting London with Birmingham. The Grand Junction specialized in long-distance transit, but it was unique in that most canals were designed to transport coal or agricultural goods to nearby urban areas. There was another flurry of canal promotion in the early 1810s but it was less substantial than the canal mania. By 1830 the era of new canal construction was largely over, but not before nearly 2000 miles of navigable canals had been completed. 2 For an overview of road improvements see Albert (1972) and Pawson (1977) . 3 For an overview of improvements in ports see Jackson (1983) . 4 For an overview of canal development see Ward (1974) and Duckham (1983) .
Legal and organizational aspects of transport improvements
Road, port, and canal improvements shared a common feature in that they all required an act of Parliament for their implementation. Common law and statutory law dating from the 1500s dictated that local inhabitants were required to provide for the maintenance of nearby roads, waterways, and ports, but they were not required to improve them. Even if local inhabitants wanted to build a new road, canal, or dock it would have been difficult without first obtaining rights-of-way through an act of Parliament. In the 18th century, acts were very specific in that they gave a group of individuals, a city, or a company the right to improve a particular road, canal, or port. Improvements might include new construction, the diversion or widening of an exiting route, or simply better maintenance. Acts were also crucial because they gave individuals, cities, and companies' rights to levy tolls and issue bonds secured by the income from the tolls. The tolls and bonds provided the financial sources which paid for most projects. The tolls were particularly important for roads because they allowed local communities to share the fiscal burden with through-travelers (see Levinson 2002) .
Throughout the 1700s and early 1800s Parliament passed thousands of acts dealing with local infrastructure (Innes 1998) . Interestingly very few of these acts were initiated by the Ministry or Parliament. Instead local individuals and officials initiated acts with petitions submitted to Parliament. For example, in 1742, the Justices of Peace, gentlemen, and other persons living near the road between Harlow and Great Chesterford submitted the following petition stating the need for an act to improve their road:
The aforesaid road about 25 miles in length, is by reason of the deepness of the soil and many heavy carriages passing through it, become very ruinous and in the winter many parts are almost impassable for wagons and carriages, and also for horses laden; and other parts are dangerous to travelers, and the roads cannot by the ordinary course appointed by laws and statutes be effectually amended without the aid of an act of parliament.
5
The preceding petition resulted in the passage of an act for repairing and widening the road between Harlow and Great Chesterford in the same year of 1742. 6 Such acts are sometimes referred to as 'turnpike acts,' because they authorized the erection of a gate for collecting tolls. Similar petitions were also introduced by local propertyowners, businessmen, and officials stating the need to build wet docks or canals. In this sense, the development of roads, ports, and canals was highly decentralized. Parliament approved projects, but it did not initiate them.
Parliament did influence transport development through its regulations. One of the most important concerned the organizational form of transport authorities. Road acts named several individuals living near the road as trustees and gave them authority to make decisions about improvements, but it forbade trustees from earning direct profits from the tolls. Instead it was expected that trustees would be willing to implement and oversee road improvements for the betterment of their nearby property or business. Many early port authorities were also restricted from earning profits through the tolls, but starting in the early 1800s it was increasingly common for port acts to create joint-stock companies with legal rights to pay dividends to shareholders. Many dock improvements in the major ports, like Bristol, Hull, and London, were undertaken by joint stock companies as opposed to dock trusts (Jackson 1983, p. 203) . For canals, joint stock companies were always the dominant organizational form. Their financial success varied, but dividends were generally high, averaging 5.75% (see Duckham 1983, p. 123) . The indirect returns from canals were also large, particularly for mining interests and industrialists.
Factors influencing transport development
The English transport network developed between 1760 and 1830 due to several factors. At a macro-level, annual fluctuations in investment were related to changes in interest rates, trade, or industrial production. T.S. Ashton (1968) argued that infrastructure projects in the 18th century were sensitive to long-term interest rates because they entailed large up-front investments in materials and structures. Ashton's argument has been criticized in many works, but it remains a key hypothesis in the literature. 7 Another argument is that higher economic growth in the 1760s, 1790s, and 1810s stimulated transport investment, while the economic slowdown in the 1770s and 1800s deterred investment.
8 Economic growth was important because it influenced the expected revenues earned by road, port, and canal projects. It also influenced the indirect returns earned by property-owners and businesses.
There is some evidence in the literature that network externalities also affected English transport development. For example, it appears that some communities delayed road improvements until other communities improved contiguous roads, particularly those that provided connections to London (Bogart 2007) . There is also some evidence that communities learned about the benefits of road improvements from neighboring communities (Albert 1972) . Of particular importance in this paper is the possibility that externalities existed between modes, like roads, canals, and ports. Baron Duckham (1983, p. 132) argues that ports, like Liverpool, were spurred by the development of canals in their hinterland and even further away. John Armstrong and Philip Bagwell (1983, p. 161) argue that in many ports, coastal ships "fed the river barges and canal boats with traffic and in return were fed by them." Eric Pawson (1977) argues that developments in road and waterway transport were inter-dependent; noting that many turnpike roads were connected with river ports (p. 164). Lastly, Charles Hadfield provides evidence that the Duke of Bridgewater changed the route of his famous canal so that it would end in Manchester in part because road access was better (1968, p. 29) .
The existing literature has noted the inter-connection between road, canal, and port development, but it has not formulated testable hypotheses regarding how road, canal, and port improvements were inter-related. The following section describes data on road, canal, and port improvement acts. The subsequent section uses investment theory to develop testable hypotheses on the inter-relationship between modes.
2 Data: road, canal, and port improvement acts
The Parliamentary Archives (2007) maintains a database with the titles of every act in Britain starting in 1500. Bogart and Richardson (2006) have used the titles to identify every act dealing with specific road, canal, and port improvements between 1760 and 1830. The data are particularly useful because they specify the location and the year when every project was approved by Parliament.
There were two main types of road, canal, and port acts. The second type of statutory authority act amended rights granted in a previous act. Most renewed or enlarged the powers of existing authorities, but did not propose additional improvements. Some amendment acts, however, included new projects that were to be undertaken by the same statutory authority. For example, an act in 1824 was passed "to abridge, vary, extend and improve the Bristol and Taunton Canal Navigation, and to alter the Powers of an Act of the Fifty-first Year of His late Majesty for making the said Canal."
12 In this particular case, the rights of the Bristol and Taunton canal company were amended, in part so that they could improve and extend the canal.
In order to analyze the inter-connection between road, canal, and port development it is necessary to separate all acts that authorized improvements from acts that simply amended rights. For roads, I use William Albert's (1972) Following Bogart and Richardson (2006) , I use the Parliamentary Archives data to create a similar series by combining all acts for making canals with amendment acts that authorized extensions, branches, or variations of the canal route. I also combine all acts that authorized construction, repairs, or extensions to quays, docks, piers or any other work related to port improvements. Together the data consist of an annual time-series on all road, canal, and port improvement acts in England between 1760 and 1830. Figure 1 shows the number of road, port, and canal improvement acts in England in each year from 1760 to 1830. Road improvement acts were very high in the 1760s, 1790s, and 1820s. The canal mania of the 1790s had the greatest number of canal acts, but it was not the only period of improvement, as many canal acts were passed in both the 1760s and early 1810s. Port improvement acts were less common, which is to be expected given the limited number of suitable coastal sites. Also there was no equivalent to the canal mania, in which a cluster of port improvements were initiated in a few years.
Road, canal, and port improvement acts are also separated into the north, west midlands, east midlands, southeast, and the southwest of England based on the locations described in the act. 13 In many cases, canal and road improvements spanned multiple counties and so I chose to analyze regions rather than counties. 1 7 6 3 1 7 6 6 1 7 6 9 1 7 7 2 1 7 7 5 1 7 7 8 1 7 8 1 1 7 8 4 1 7 8 7 1 7 9 0 1 7 9 3 1 7 9 6 1 7 9 9 1 8 0 2 1 8 0 5 1 8 0 8 1 8 1 1 1 8 1 4 1 8 1 7 1 8 2 0 1 8 2 3 1 8 2 6 1 8 2 9
Acts in each Year Moreover, the region is a useful unit of analysis because some transport improvements affected projects in neighboring counties, but not in neighboring regions. Other economic and political variables are also incorporated into the analysis. Interest rates are measured using the real yield on long-term government bonds, known as consols. Bond yields come from Global Financial Data (2007) and are available on an annual basis from 1700 to 1830. For the inflation rate, I use a 3-year moving average of the percentage change in Greg Clark's (2001) consumer price index. As yet there is no widely-accepted time-series on annual British G.D.P. growth between 1760 and 1830. Instead, I use Crafts and Harley's (1992) estimates of the annual growth rate for industrial production. Manufacturing was the most dynamic sector in the British economy and thus the growth rate of industrial production represents a key component of G.D.P. growth. Warfare is another factor that affected the benefits of roads, ports, and canals by changing domestic and international trade patterns. The general histories by Holmes and Szechi (1993) and Evans (2001) provide all years when Britain was at war.
Inter-modal network externalities and transport investment: theory
Economists have traditionally modeled investment decisions using net present value (NPV) calculations. According to the NPV-rule firms will invest whenever the expected present value of all future benefits exceeds the present value of investment and maintenance costs. Several economists have pointed out that the standard NPVrule omits the option value of waiting to decide whether to invest in the future (see Pindyck 1991). The option value can be significant if investments are irreversible and there are uncertainties about the benefits or costs of investing. Once these uncertainties are resolved, the option value of waiting diminishes and investments are either undertaken or they are dropped.
This theoretical framework can be applied to network externalities between road, canal, and port investments. For example, if the improvement of nearby roads and ports makes it easier to bring goods to and from a canal, then the option value of waiting to decide whether to invest in a canal tomorrow diminishes when road and port projects are completed today because there is less uncertainty about the future benefits of the canal. Consider the following numeral example which is based on Pindyck (1991). Suppose there is a canal project that costs £800 to complete and that the risk-free interest rate is 10%. Suppose further that if the canal is constructed in year zero it will yield a benefit of £50 in year zero and the same for all subsequent years unless nearby road and port projects are completed, in which case the canal will yield a benefit of £150. Lastly, assume that canal promoters are uncertain in year zero whether road and port projects will be completed, but this will be revealed in year 1. For the moment, suppose that promoters believe there is a 50% probability that road and port projects will be completed.
If investing in year 0 was the only option, then canal promoters would go ahead with their project because the expected net present value of the canal is £250. 14 14 The net present value of investing in year zero is À800 þ 50 þ 0:
However, it would be better to wait until year 1 and find out whether nearby road and port projects are completed. The NPV of waiting to decide to invest in year 1 is £386, which is greater than the NPV of investing in year 0. 15 The option value is higher because canal promoters will only initiate the project in year 1 if nearby road and port projects are completed.
The preceding example illustrates the main hypothesis that more road, canal, or port projects should have been initiated once it was known that nearby road, canal, and port projects would be completed in the future. 16 More specific hypotheses can be developed by adding several features to the model. First, there was a time-lag between the act of parliament that initiated transport projects and their date of completion. The earlier example can be modified to show that canal promoters will initiate their project once they learn that road and port acts have been passed and not when these projects are completed. 17 The reason is that much of the uncertainty about the future benefits of the canal would have been resolved once road and port acts were passed. However, if there was some probability that projects would not be completed even when an authorizing act was passed, then promoters might delay their project until after they learned more about the likelihood or degree of completion. The implication is that acts authorizing road, canal, or port improvements may not have been passed until 1 or 2 years after acts for nearby road, canal, and port projects were passed.
Second, the timing of investment may be different across the modes because of differences in construction times. Typically road and port projects took 3 to 4 years to complete following their act, while canal projects usually took 5 years or more.
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If the earlier example is adapted so that the canal takes 1 year longer to complete than nearby road and port projects, the NPV calculations suggest that the canal promoter will initiate as soon as they learn that road and port acts have been passed. The reason is that promoters lose revenues if they are constructing their canal long after nearby roads and ports have been completed. 19 Now consider the decision to 15 The net present value of waiting until year 1 is 0:5 Â ½À800= 1:
16 Road, canal, and port promoters may have also delayed their projects until they knew whether manufacturing production increased or interest rates declined. I have omitted discussion of these factors, but they are incorporated in the empirical analysis. 17 Assume that all projects take one year to complete. The NPV of initiating in year 0 is still below the NPV of waiting until year one when it is known whether nearby road and port acts have been passed. In year 1, the NPV of investing is higher than the NPV of waiting to invest in year two since
18 Jim Shead (2007) provides detailed information on canal construction times. See 'History by Waterway.' For more details on the length of road improvements see Pawson (1977) . Details on port construction times are scattered throughout the literature. The River Humber organization reports that the port improvements in Hull were begun 1775 and completed in 1778. See http://website.lineone.net/~ktaylor297/index12.htm. 19 In this case, there is a possibility that the canal promoter will initiate in year zero if there is sufficiently high probability that road or harbor projects will be initiated. Suppose q is the probability that road or harbor projects are initiated in year one, then the NPV of initiating in year zero is
The NPV of waiting to decide until year 1 is
Manipulation of these two expressions shows that the NPV of initiating in year zero is higher if q>0.88.
initiate road and port projects given uncertainty about the completion of canals. Here the NPV calculations suggest that promoters will delay their road or port projects by 1 year after they learn whether canals will be initiated. 20 The reason is that the benefits of road and port projects are too small unless the canal project has been completed, and therefore, it is better to wait an extra year so that all projects open at the same time. These particular examples suggest that canal projects should have been initiated more quickly following the passage of acts authorizing road and port projects, whereas road and port projects should have been initiated more slowly after the passage of canal acts.
A final set of considerations deals with differences in how network externalities affected the benefits of roads, canals, and ports. The first deals with the definition of 'nearby projects.' Roads likely had a greater effect on canals and ports within their region because they were shorter in distance, whereas port improvements should have the widest impact of all three modes because the coastal trade was national in scope. The second addresses the fact that construction costs were much higher for canals than road or port improvements. 21 One can show in the original example, that the incentive to wait until year 1 to decide whether to invest increases with the investment cost.
22 Therefore, canal promoters should have had a greater incentive to wait until nearby road and port projects were initiated. A third consideration deals with differences in the motives of promoters across the modes. As discussed earlier, roads were promoted by non-profit trusts, who were interested in increasing their property values or business profits, whereas canals were promoted by joint-stock companies, who were interested in the direct profits from the canal. The different motives could have influenced whether inter-modal network externalities had a greater impact in one mode versus another. One possibility is that the profits earned by joint-stock canal companies were more affected by the completion of nearby road projects because toll revenues changed immediately. By contrast, property values and business profits for road trustees would have changed more slowly because of the costs of renegotiating with tenants or customers.
Empirical analysis of inter-modal network externalities
In this section, I analyze whether inter-modal network externalities influenced the development of roads, canals, and ports in England. It is useful to begin by 20 Suppose the road or port promoter knows in year one that the canal will be completed in year 3. The NPV of initiating in year one when the road/port project takes 1 year and canal projects take 2 years is À800 þ 50=1:1 þ P 21 Ward (1974) shows that construction costs for canals often exceeded £100,000. This was substantially lower than roads (see Pawson 1977) and port improvements (see Chalklin 1998, p. 14), which ranged between £10,000 and £20,000. 22 Let I be the investment costs. Using the same parameters as in footnote 16, the NPV of investing in year 0 is -I+1050. The NPV of waiting until year 1 is 0:5 Â ÀI=1:1 ð Þþ 750. Manipulating these expressions shows that the NPV of waiting until year 1 is greater than the NPV of investing in year 0 only if the investment cost exceeds 550.
examining the correlations between road, canal, and port acts and their lagged values using the national data. In Table 1 , all inter-modal correlation coefficients above 0.10 are bolded. The data show that road acts are positively correlated with ports in t−1, but negatively correlated with ports t−2 and t−4. Road acts are also negatively correlated with canals in t−3 and t−4 (see column 1). Canal acts are positively correlated with roads in t−1 and positively correlated with ports in t−1 and t−2 (see column 3). Port acts have no substantial inter-modal correlations. Table 2 reports the correlations between road, canal, and port acts within the southeast, southwest, east midlands, west midlands, and northern regions. The data show a relatively large positive correlation between canal acts in t and road acts in t− 1, but no relationship between canal acts and port acts or between road and port acts.
Vector auto-regression (VAR) analysis provides a more rigorous tool to analyze the importance of inter-modal network externalities. Before specifying the VAR model, it is necessary to determine whether the time-series variables are stationary. Table 3 reports augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for road, port, and canal improvement acts as well as the growth rate of industrial production, real interest rates, and a dummy variable for war years. The tests show that all the variables are stationary. This suggests that it is not inappropriate to examine the variables in levels. Later I discuss how the results are different when the variables are analyzed in differences.
The VAR model builds on the theory discussed earlier and specifies an interrelationship between road, port, and canal acts after controlling for the growth of industrial production, real interest rates, and war years. The following equation specifies the model.
X t is a vector that includes road, port, and canal acts in year t; Z t is a vector that includes the growth rate of industrial production, real interest rates, and a dummy for If there were intermodal network externalities, say from roads and ports to canals, then the estimation should show that higher road or port acts in some year t−k increases canal acts in t.
The model places no restrictions on which improvement acts influence the others and allows the data to reveal such relationships. The variables for the growth of industrial production, real interest rates, and warfare are assumed to be sequentially exogenous in the model. In the case of industrial production, the argument is that a higher growth rate in t−1, t−2,…,t−K will influence improvement acts, but improvement acts will not influence industrial production until at least K periods. As long as K is less than 5 years, then this argument is reasonable because road and port improvements often took 3 to 4 years to complete, and canals around five. Therefore, a significant feedback effect of improvement acts on industrial production is likely to take at least 5 years.
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Theory suggests that promoters will initiate their projects shortly after nearby projects have been authorized by their acts of Parliament. This would suggest that the lag length K should be less than 4 years. The optimal lag order can also be determined using statistical tests. The Akaike's Information Criterion test implies that the optimal lag is 2 years, while the Schwartz Bayesian Information Criterion and Hannan and Quinn Information Criterion tests imply that the optimal lag is 1 year. Below I report the results using a 1-year lag to keep the model parsimonious. The results are generally similar when 2-year lags are used. Table 4 reports the VAR estimates using the national time series. The findings suggest that inter-modal network externalities had a relatively weak influence on transport development at the national level. The results in column 1 show that road and port improvement acts in t−1 are positively associated with canal acts in t after controlling for other factors, but nether is statistically significant. In column 2, port improvement acts in t−1 are positively associated with road improvement acts in t and in column 3 canal acts in t−1 are positively associated with port improvement acts in t, but none of these coefficients is significant.
The VAR estimates in Table 4 also show that industrial production, real interest rates, and warfare had a substantial impact on transport development. There is a positive and significant relationship between a higher growth rate of industrial production in t−1 and both road and port improvement acts in t. This finding is significant because it suggests that economic growth raised the benefits of improving transportation. There is also a negative and significant relationship between real interest rates in t−1 and road improvement acts in t. This suggests that at least one transport mode was sensitive to long-term interest rates, as hypothesized by Ashton. Lastly, there is a negative and significant relationship between war in t−1 and port improvement acts in t. This finding suggests that warfare lowered the benefits of improving ports by disrupting international trade.
In the national data, the identification of inter-modal network externalities might be obscured by the distance between road, port, and canal projects. The theory suggests that promoters will be influenced by the initiation of nearby projects, but the definition of nearby projects could vary across the modes. It might be that port projects influence promoters throughout the country, while road and canal projects influence promoters in their region only. These possibilities can be explored using the regional series on road, port, and canal improvement acts. Table 5 reports estimates from a VAR model which pools the data from four of the five regions. The west midlands region is dropped in this specification because it is landlocked and has no ports. The results show there is evidence that road improvements influenced canal development at the regional level. In column 1, canal acts in t are positively associated with road acts in t−1 after controlling for the other factors. However, there is still no evidence that port improvements influenced roads and canals, or that canals influenced roads and ports. Table 6 reports estimates from a pooled regional VAR analysis that drops port improvement acts and adds the west midlands region. The conclusions are the same as Table 5 . They show a positive and significant relationship between canals acts in t and road acts in t−1. Overall, the results suggest that roads affected canal projects in their region, but not in the country as a whole. This makes sense given that improved roads were between 10 and 20 miles in length and thus they were likely to influence decisions regarding canal projects within 50 or 100 miles which is the approximate length or width of most regions.
The preceding analysis focused on the relationship between road, canal, and port acts in levels. The variables can also be analyzed in first differences. In this case, the VAR estimates identify whether an increase (or decrease) in road acts from year t−2 to t−1 resulted in an increase (or decrease) in canal acts from t−1 to t. Table 7 shows the estimates of the VAR model using differences of the national data and Table 8 shows the estimates using differences of the regional data. Both the national and regional data show that the difference in canals acts in t is positively correlated with the difference in road acts in t−1 after controlling for other factors. This is similar to the earlier finding that the level of canal acts in t is positively correlated with the level of road acts in t−1. The results are somewhat different for port and canal acts. The national and regional data show that the difference in road acts in t is positively correlated with the difference in port acts in t−1, while the national data show that the difference in ports acts in t is positively correlated with the difference in canal acts in t−1. Thus there is some evidence that port development contributed to road development and canal development contributed to port development, but these results hold only in some specifications. Table 7 Vector auto-regressions: national time series in differences with 1-year lag Δx in t−1 references to the difference in variable x between year t−1 and t−2 a Indicates statistical significance at 90% or above
The results can be interpreted using the model of investment under uncertainty. The most robust conclusion is that the option value of waiting to invest in a canal diminished when nearby road projects were initiated because there was less uncertainty about the future benefits. Canals typically took longer to complete than roads, and therefore canal promoters would have lost more revenues if they did not initiate their project as soon as nearby road projects were authorized by Parliament. Furthermore construction costs were higher for canals than roads or ports, and therefore the value of waiting until nearby road projects were initiated should have been higher for canal promoters. Building a canal without adequate road connections could be a very costly mistake for promoters.
The results are also consistent with the argument that organizational differences made canal promoters more reactive to the initiation of road projects. Roads were improved by non-profit trusts whose main goal was to increase local property values or business profits. It is possible that these indirect benefits changed more slowly in response to the completion of nearby canals or harbors because of the transaction costs of renegotiating rents with tenants or renegotiating prices with customers. Canals, on the other hand, were promoted by joint stock companies whose main objective was to maximize profits from the tolls. It is likely that the toll revenues changed more quickly when nearby road and port projects were completed because traffic on the canal increased. The direct profit-motive thus strengthened inter-modal externalities.
Conclusion
Transport networks include several infrastructure modes. Each mode can operate independently, but only to a limited extent because of the need for trans-shipment. Goods entering ports rarely stay near the docks, and instead they are shipped by rail, road, or inland waterway to distant markets or factories. Some goods, like agricultural products, are shipped by road from dispersed locations before being transported by rail or water over greater distances. Different modes also complement Table 8 Vector auto-regressions: regional time series in differences with 1-year lag
Coeff ( one another by relieving congestion. Without adequate roads or airports, passengers and high-value goods must be shipped by rail or water, thus adding to congestion on these modes. Likewise without rail and waterways, freight and low-value goods will add to congestion on roads and in the air. Although it is clear that different modes are complementary, it is not obvious that inter-modal externalities significantly affect the development of transport networks. For example, it is not clear that private or public authorities would build or improve fewer roads if ports and other waterways were under-developed. The potential for inefficient investment is likely to be greater when decision-making is decentralized, because individuals or local organizations do not take spillovers into account when they choose to undertake a project. This paper uses history to address whether inter-modal network externalities had a significant effect on the development of roads, canals, and ports in England from 1760 to 1830. Over this 70-year period, Britain made substantial investments in its transport network, making it one of the most extensive in the world. Using a VAR model with regional time-series data on road, port, and canal improvement acts, I show that canal acts in year t were associated with higher road acts in t−1 after controlling for other factors. This finding does not necessary imply that inter-modal externalities existed, but they do strongly suggest that the option value of waiting to invest in canals diminished when nearby roads were initiated. Future research should further examine the inter-connection between roads, ports, and canals through casestudy analysis or through additional econometric analysis.
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The findings have implications for the literature on the development of the British transport network during the Industrial Revolution period. Canals are often viewed as the most important transport improvement of this era, and there are also suggestions that canals spurred the development of other transport modes. The results here suggest that canals did not have spillover effects on roads and instead canals were partly driven by roads. The results also suggest that the accumulation of road infrastructure might have contributed to a significant increase in aggregate economic growth by providing greater road transport services and increasing the returns to canal projects.
The results also have broader policy implications because they suggest that inter-modal network externalities can influence the development of transport networks, particularly under a decentralized system of decision-making. It is not clear whether there were long delays in canal improvements because road authorities did not internalize the spillovers from their investment, but there was a clear potential for inefficiency. Policy-makers need to consider the broader benefits of each transport mode and if necessary to coordinate or subsidize projects with significant spillovers. and also a Navigable Branch from the said intended Canal, at or near Borwick, to or near Warton Cragg: and also another Navigable Branch from, at or near Gale Moss, by Chorley, to or near Duxbury in the said County Palatine of Lancaster; and also for making a Navigable Branch from the said Canal, at or near Galgate, to Glasson Dock in the said County Palatine of Lancaster 1793 An Act to vary and extend the Line of the Canal authorized to be made by an Act, intituled, An Act for making and maintaining a Navigable Canal from the City of Hereford to the City of Gloucester, with a Collateral Cut from the same to the Town of Newent, in the County of Gloucester, and to amend the said Act 1794 An Act for making and maintaining a Navigable Canal from Wisbech River, at or near a Place 
